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Comment on Rosaldo's "The Use and Abuse of Anthropology" 
Linda J. Nicholson 
In "The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and 
Cross-cultural Understanding" (Signs 5, no. 3 [Spring 1980]: 389-417), 
Michelle Rosaldo raised serious questions about a theoretical model of 
great importance to contemporary feminist theory, one that she herself 
had earlier helped to construct. This model offers the opposition be- 
tween "domestic" and "public" spheres as the explanation for the sup- 
posedly universal differences in status among men and women, and 
attributes women's universally inferior status to women's universal in- 
volvement in childbearing and child rearing. Rosaldo argues, I believe 
correctly, that the model as so constructed is ahistorical and hides the 
diverse causes and content of gender roles. As she points out, one cannot 
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merely look to the things women do, still less to the ways women biologi- 
cally are, to explain the social organization of gender. The ways women 
"biologically are" or the things that "women do" are always part of a 
given social system that interprets such biology and such activities in 
specific ways. Moreover, these specificities in cultural interpretation 
themselves reflect relations of power that are lost in an appeal to a 
universal domestic/public explanation. Thus she comes to the conclusion 
"that women's status is itself not one but many things, that various mea- 
sures of women's place do not appear to correlate among themselves, 
and, furthermore, that few of them appear to be consistently related to 
an isolable 'cause'" (p. 401). 
As is made clear by Rosaldo's criticisms, the gravest danger that 
results from relying on the evidence of women's biology or women's 
activities in the construction of feminist theory is that we read into this 
evidence assumptions from our own culture. There is nothing in itself 
problematic about the assertion that in all human societies women bear 
children-a statement resembling the assertion that in all human 
societies women and men urinate. Moreover, it may be that in all 
societies women have the primary responsibility for early child care. The 
important issue, however, is whether in our judgments about the 
significance of such universals we project onto other cultures a meaning 
borrowed from our own culture. At least within post-Victorian society, 
women's association with childbearing can certainly be taken as a 
significant one, closely allied to the identification of women with the 
"natural." Also within our society, childbearing and child rearing take 
place in a context where women are devalued. However, if only because 
of the effect such association of the feminine with the biological or the 
quasibiological has upon us, we need to be careful about projecting our 
assumptions where they might not belong. In short, we need to be care- 
ful lest we too easily deduce the political from the biological.' 
Rosaldo has raised certain needed caveats for contemporary 
feminist theory. However, in doing so she makes certain claims with 
which I would disagree. Rosaldo connects the methodological problems 
she has pointed to with the inclination of contemporary feminists to 
search for "origins." As she notes, a persistent endency in contemporary 
feminist writing-one that she claims reflects an old-fashioned evolu- 
tionary approach-has been the attempt to uncover the roots of modern 
forms of male dominance in our far-distant past. She argues that be- 
cause of this tendency feminists have been willing to grant to anthropol- 
1. The claim that we need to differentiate questions of politics or power from other 
types of generalizations replicates an argument Iris Young recently made about Nancy 
Chodorow's work in a panel at the American Philosophical Association meetings in Boston 
in December 1980. Young argued that we need to distinguish the process of gender 
development and differentiation from the process by which women are devalued and 
denied power; she maintained that Chodorow's work explains only the former. 
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ogy an importance not accorded by other social theory. Rather than 
employing anthropology to supply "comparative insights," feminist writ- 
ers use anthropology to locate the present in the past. The consequence 
is a tendency to ignore historical diversity. 
What I would argue in response is that there is no necessary con- 
nection between the methodological errors Rosaldo has pointed to and a 
search for origins. A search for origins can be understood in a variety of 
different ways, not all of which lead to an ahistorical methodology. If the 
goal were to search for replicas of the present in the past, then it would 
be difficult o reconcile this search with a sensitivity to historical diversity. 
However, the search for origins may be conceived of rather as the at- 
tempt to link our present with a quite different past, as the telling of a 
tale whose beginnings may be markedly different from its end. I believe 
this distinction is important because I would not want it to be concluded 
from Rosaldo's article that we must abandon a search for origins in order 
to avoid the methodological problems she has correctly identified. Try- 
ing to understand how we got where we are remains, I believe, an im- 
portant task, and history in the broad sense is a tool we ought not to 
relinquish. 
Moreover, it might be the case that the opposition between domestic 
and public spheres, differently interpreted, could be of crucial im- 
portance in our tale. Since this opposition certainly does help to struc- 
ture gender relations in our contemporary society, it seems worthwhile 
at least to explore how far back the separation extends, where and how 
its meanings change, and what the connections are, if any, with the 
politics of gender. In other words, while we recognize that anything we 
shall call "domestic" or "public" must refer to specific social constructions 
with their own forms of significance and not to anything which can be 
reduced to biology, may it not be the case that there are certain con- 
nections between such constructions and others extending back in his- 
tory? We could describe these similarities as being like "family re- 
semblances," in that they exhibit varying shared features as well as types 
and degrees of differences. 
The domestic/public opposition, if understood in this sense, might 
be said to be methodologically comparable to the category "class" in 
Marxian theory. While I would argue that the connotation of the term 
"class" must be understood differently in different historical contexts, 
nevertheless I would also claim that the term plays a useful function in 
Marxian theory in part as an account of such differences. It remains, of 
course, to be seen whether the category "domestic/public" possesses the 
same power of explanation as the category "class." I myself incline to the 
belief that it might, in part because I see much interesting work being 
done that can be said to exemplify the type of framework sketched 
above. Thus I believe that historians such as Ellen DuBois and Eli 
Zaretsky have provided interesting insights on our recent past in the 
This content downloaded from 128.252.66.152 on Fri, 7 Nov 2014 14:24:51 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Spring 1982 735 
United States and in England in part by elaborating on the changing 
meanings that the opposition between domestic and public has taken on 
within that past.2 Other historians have provided comparable insights in 
reference to other historical periods-Marilyn Arthur in ancient Greece 
and Rome, and Natalie Zemon Davis and Lawrence Stone in early mod- 
ern France and England, respectively.3 Such work, with that of others, 
might be said to form the beginnings of a feminist history of Western 
civilization both different from the one with which we grew up and 
broader than the Marxian account. Moreover, there appears no reason 
to rule out the possibility that our tale might have certain interesting 
connections with phenomena occurring prior to the Greeks or with his- 
tories of other cultures, and here feminist anthropology and archaeol- 
ogy might play an important role. 
Even if the category "domestic/public" should turn out to have lim- 
ited theoretical usefulness, this would not negate the kind of approach I 
am arguing for: an approach that is both theoretical and historical. 
Rosaldo was correct in noting the ahistorical tendency in much of con- 
temporary feminist theory. Her reminder that women's status is not one 
but many things and her warning against understanding the domestic in 
biological terms should be listened to. I, however, would also caution 
against any countertendencies in the direction of a historical relativism, 
that is, toward a rejection of explanations altogether in favor of a variety 
of descriptions. 
Department of Educational and Social Thought 
State University of New York at Albany 
2. See esp. Ellen DuBois, "The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage Movement: Notes 
toward the Reconstruction of Nineteenth-Century Feminism," Feminist Studies 3, nos. 1-2 
(Fall 1975): 63-71; and Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1976), p. 57. 
3. Marilyn Arthur, "'Liberated' Women: The Classical Era," in Becoming Visible: 
Women in European History, ed. Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1977), pp. 60-89; Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern 
France (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975); and Lawrence Stone, The Family, 
Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800 (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). 
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